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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

EFFECTS OF MINDFULNESS AND MEDITATION EXPERIENCE ON COGNITIVE
AND EMOTIONAL FUNCTIONING AND EGO DEPLETION
Mindfulness is increasingly recognized as an important phenomenon both clinically and
empirically, with mindfulness-based interventions demonstrated to be efficacious across a
wide variety of patient populations and disorders (i.e., Baer, 2003). Though debate
regarding the exact definition of mindfulness continues, generally accepted definitions
involve the common elements of intentionally directing attention toward the present
moment and adopting an accepting, nonjudgmental, and/or nonreactive orientation,
intent, or attitude (i.e., Baer et al., 2006; Bishop et al., 2004). Several testable predictions
in the cognitive and emotional domains were derived from the operational definition of
mindfulness provided by Bishop et al. (2004). Recent empirical work (i.e., Chambers, Lo,
& Allen, 2008; Valentine & Sweet, 1999) has supported Bishop et al.’s predictions,
providing initial validation of their operationalization of mindfulness. However, most
work on the effects of meditation practice and the mindfulness construct has relied on
self-report methodology. The current work transcended past research by using behavioral
methods to investigate the effects of meditation practice, correlates of trait mindfulness,
and validity of current conceptualizations of mindfulness. Additionally, the current work
investigated relationships between meditation, mindfulness, and self-regulation using
behavioral methods. This investigation was warranted as recent theoretical work
suggested that increased self-control abilities may be the primary mechanism by which
mindfulness-based interventions work and that higher levels of trait mindfulness may
appear to be related to enhanced well-being due to the unmeasured third variable of
enhanced self-regulatory abilities (Masicampo & Baumeister, 2007). Ninety-eight
individuals (33 meditators, 33 age-matched nonmeditating controls, and 32 students)
completed self-report and behavioral measures of attention, learning, memory, cognitive
and emotional biases, and self-regulation in individual sessions. Results demonstrated
that meditation practice related to few of the measured constructs, with significant group
differences detected between the meditators and nonmeditators in short-term memory,
long-term memory, and self-regulation only. Self-reported trait mindfulness in the
nonmeditators related only to self-reported psychological well-being. These results stand

in stark contrast to most of the current literature on meditation and mindfulness. The
research raises more questions about the effects of meditation practice and
conceptualization of mindfulness than it answers, though multiple interpretations of the
data are possible.
KEYWORDS: Meditation, mindfulness, behavioral measures, neurocognition, selfregulation
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Chapter One
Introduction
The mindfulness construct has recently received significantly increased attention
in both the clinical and empirical domains. Mindfulness developed out of eastern spiritual
traditions that suggest that mindfulness can be cultivated through regular meditation
practice and that the development of mindfulness will likely result in reduced suffering
and increases in positive personal qualities, such as awareness, insight, wisdom,
compassion, and equanimity (Goldstein, 2002; Kabat-Zinn, 2000). Non-religious
adaptations of traditional mindfulness practices have been incorporated into a variety of
psychological interventions that conceptualize mindfulness as a set of skills that can be
learned and practiced to reduce suffering and increase well-being. These interventions
include dialectical behavior therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993a, 1993b), mindfulness-based
stress reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1982, 1990), mindfulness-based cognitive therapy
(MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002), acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT;
Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), relapse prevention for substance abuse (Marlatt &
Gordon, 1985; Parks, Anderson, & Marlatt, 2001), and variants of these approaches.
Interventions incorporating mindfulness have been shown to be efficacious across a wide
variety of patient populations and disorders, including both psychological and medical
disorders (Baer, 2003; Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004; Kabat-Zinn et al.,
1992; Kenny & Williams, 2007; Kutz et al., 1985; Ramel, Goldin, Carmona, & McQuaid,
2004; Miller, Fletcher, & Kabat-Zinn, 1995; Semple, Reid, & Miller, 2005).
While debate over the precise definition of mindfulness continues, generally
accepted conceptualizations involve the multiple common elements of intentionally
directing attention toward the present moment and adopting an accepting, nonjudgmental,
and/or nonreactive orientation, intent, or attitude (Bare et al., 2006; Bishop et al., 2004;
Brown & Ryan, 2003; Fletcher & Hayes, 2005; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Linehan, 1993a;
Marlatt & Kristeller, 1999). Mindfulness is contrasted with states of mind in which
attention is focused elsewhere, such as preoccupation with mental events outside of
present experience (memories, worries, plans, etc.) or with behaving automatically and
without awareness (Baer et al., 2006; Bishop et al., 2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003). Bishop
et al. (2004) provided a widely cited operational definition of mindfulness and proposed
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several testable predictions that, if confirmed, would contribute to the validation of the
mindfulness construct. Similar to many definitions in the field, this conceptualization of
mindfulness includes the self-regulation of attention directed toward the immediate
present and the adoption of a curious, open, and accepting orientation toward one’s
present moment experiences. Because mindfulness includes the self-regulation of
attention, Bishop et al. (2004) predicted that increases in mindfulness should lead to
increases in the specific attentional abilities of sustained attention, or the ability to
maintain a state of vigilance over prolonged periods of time (Posner & Rothbart, 1992),
switching, or flexibility of attention so that one can shift focus from one object to another
(Posner, 1980), and inhibition of secondary elaborative processing of thoughts, feelings,
and sensations that arise in response to a stimulus. Additionally, because mindfulness
includes an open and accepting stance toward whatever one experiences, it was predicted
that mindfulness practice should lead to less experiential avoidance and improved affect
tolerance. Thus, mindfulness practice was hypothesized to lead to improvements in
specific aspects of cognitive and emotional functioning.
Although these hypotheses were not tested by Bishop et al. (2004), multiple
investigations have begun to support their assertions regarding the impact of meditation
experience on attentional control. For example, Chambers, Lo, and Allen (2008) found
that participation in an intensive 10-day mindfulness meditation retreat led to significant
increases in self-reported mindfulness and performance-based measures of working
memory and sustained attention, relative to a control group who did not receive
mindfulness training. Valentine and Sweet (1999) demonstrated that individuals with
meditation experience had superior performance on tests of sustained attention when
compared with controls and that long-term meditators had better performance than did
short-term meditators. Slagter et al. (2007) demonstrated that three months of meditation
training resulted in a significantly smaller attentional blink deficit and reduced brainresource allocation to an initial target in those receiving the training, as compared with a
matched control group. The attentional blink deficit refers to an effect wherein a second
target presented in close temporal proximity to an initial target in a rapid stream of events
often is not seen, which is attributed to competition between the two targets for limited
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attentional resources. These findings all appear supportive of the notion that mindfulness
practice leads to increased attentional control.
Results suggesting that meditation practice leads to increases in more specific
aspects of attentional functioning have also been found. For example, Tang et al. (2007)
demonstrated that five days of meditation training led to increased conflict monitoring, or
an increased ability to prioritize among competing tasks and responses, which suggests
superior executive attentional abilities. Similarly, Jha, Krompinger, and Baime (2007)
demonstrated that experienced meditators had superior conflict monitoring relative to
those without meditation experience. Jha et al. (2007) also demonstrated that participants
who completed an 8-week MBSR group, which involves extensive practice of
mindfulness meditation exercises, showed significant improvements in directing and
limiting attention (orienting) after training, while experienced meditators who took part in
a one month intensive retreat showed significant improvements in achieving and
maintaining an alert state of preparedness (alerting).
Another body of literature has examined the impact of meditation experience and
self-reported mindfulness skills on orientation to present moment experiences. Several
mindfulness questionnaires have been developed recently, and the most comprehensive
appears to be the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006) which
is based on a factor analysis of several independently developed mindfulness instruments.
Research utilizing the FFMQ has shown that, even after controlling for demographic
variables such as age, education, and mental health training, meditation experience is
significantly associated with levels of self-reported mindfulness, suggesting that the
practice of mindfulness meditation leads to increases in the self-reported tendency to use
mindfulness skills in daily life (Baer et al., 2007; Carmody & Baer, 2008; Lykins & Baer,
in press). Lykins & Baer (in press) also found that both meditation experience and total
mindfulness scores from the FFMQ were significantly positively associated with
openness to experience, reflection, psychological well-being, and self-compassion and
negatively associated with thought suppression, fear of emotion, difficulties in emotion
regulation, cognitive failures, rumination, and psychological symptoms. Significant group
differences between meditators and nonmeditators were found in the expected directions
for most of these variables. Mediation analyses supported the hypothesis that increases in
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the general tendency to be mindful mediate the relationship between meditation
experience and well-being. That is, meditation practice appears to lead to increased
mindfulness in daily life, which in turn facilitates psychological health. Chambers et al.
(2008) found that participation in an intensive 10-day meditation retreat led to significant
decreases in depressive symptoms and rumination relative to a control group, while Tang
et al. (2007) found that a brief mindfulness training led to lower anxiety, depression,
anger, and fatigue and higher vigor and to a significant decrease in stress-related cortisol
and an increase in immunoreactivity. These studies support the notion that mindfulness
training decreases experiential avoidance, improves affect tolerance, and improves
general emotional functioning, though they relied primarily on self-report methodology,
which is problematic in several ways.
However, additional studies have begun to use more objective behavioral methods
to study the relationship between the adoption of a mindful stance toward presentmoment experience and emotional functioning. For example, Wenk-Sormaz (2005)
demonstrated that a mindfulness induction in the laboratory promoted less automatized
and habitual responding on an emotional Stroop task, suggesting increases in attentional
control in the emotional domain. Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, and Hofmann (2006)
demonstrated that individuals diagnosed with mood and anxiety disorders who were
instructed to watch a distressing film clip in an accepting, mindful way experienced faster
recovery from the induced negative affect than those instructed to suppress their reactions
to the film. Arch & Craske (2006) showed that individuals completing a focused
breathing induction in which they were instructed to focus nonjudgmental attention on
their breath, as compared with individuals engaging in unfocused attention or worrying,
experienced the least emotional volatility while viewing emotion-relevant slides and the
greatest willingness to view highly negative slides (Arch & Craske, 2006). Further,
individuals high in anxiety sensitivity who received training in acceptance through the
use of the Chinese finger trap metaphor (Hayes et al., 1999), which demonstrates how an
accepting orientation can be used more successfully than a resisting orientation in
response to a challenging situation, were demonstrated to be less behaviorally avoidant
and fearful than participants engaging in diaphragmatic breathing or receiving no
instructions when inhaling carbon dioxide enriched air (Eifert & Heffner, 2003). These
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studies provide behavioral evidence that mindfulness leads to increased emotional
flexibility, decreased experiential avoidance, and improved affect tolerance.
Despite the promise of these newly developed psychotherapeutic techniques and
the developing evidence supporting the notion that mindfulness practice increases
attentional control and improves emotional functioning, some fundamental questions
regarding the cognitive, emotional, and self-regulatory effects of mindfulness remain.
While some studies have demonstrated effects of mindfulness practice on cognitive
abilities, these studies are few in number and support only some of Bishop et al.’s (2004)
hypotheses. No studies have specifically demonstrated effects of mindfulness on attention
switching or inhibition of elaborative processing, though some studies may be suggestive
of these phenomena. Additionally, many aspects of cognitive functioning have not been
examined in relation to mindfulness skills, though they are known to be related to
attentional processes. For example, both working memory (or activated memory) and
long-term memory are largely dependent upon present moment direction of attention
(Cowan, 1997). Thus, the influence of mindfulness practice on switching and inhibition
of elaborative processing, as well as working and long-term memory, deserves
investigation. Further, while the Chambers et al. (2008) study demonstrated superior
working memory performance following participation in a mindfulness retreat, the
processes underlying this finding were not examined. An increase in working memory
performance could be due to an increase in the capacity of working memory or to the
superior use of chunking strategies. Thus, the question of why working memory
performance is improved also merits investigation. Further, no known studies have used
behavioral methodologies to examine the influence of meditation status (meditator versus
nonmeditator) on orientation to one’s present-moment experiences. Finally, as
mindfulness skills vary naturally in the population even in the absence of meditation
practice (Baer et al., 2006), the influence of trait mindfulness on cognitive and emotional
functioning should also be investigated. The current study will attempt to address these
identified holes in the literature by examining the influence of mindfulness practice and
trait mindfulness on vigilance, sustained attention, switching, working memory, longterm memory, inhibition of elaborative processing, and orientation to emotional
experiences. In addition, if the previous finding that working memory performance is
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superior in meditators (as compared with nonmeditators) is replicated, the current study
will investigate potential reasons for this finding.
An additional goal of the present study is to explore the impact of meditation
experience and mindfulness on self-regulation. Self-regulation refers to the capacity to
engage in behavior guided by goals or standards and to alter or override one’s own
response tendencies, including thoughts, emotions, and actions, when necessary to pursue
goals or meet standards. The process of self-regulation is strongly influenced by
executive functioning and is activated when a discrepancy is detected between one’s
current state and one’s goals or expectancies. Self-regulatory capacity has been
demonstrated to function as a reserve of strength, with the ability to self-regulate
declining over prolonged or multiple efforts, a temporary effect known as ego depletion.
In multiple studies, when participants are first asked to complete a self-control task,
performance on a second, unrelated, task has been found to be worse than that of a
control group who has not just engaged in a depleting task (Baumeister, 2002). For
example, participants have been found to squeeze a handgrip for a shorter period of time
after being asked to amplify or suppress emotions while watching a sad video clip
compared with individuals who were not asked to regulate their emotions (Muraven,
Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). Another study demonstrated that individuals who were asked
to eat only from a bowl of radishes while seated in front of chocolates and cookies after
having skipped a meal subsequently gave up faster on geometric figure tracing puzzles as
compared with controls who either were able to eat the sweets or who were not exposed
to food of any kind during the task (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998).
Multiple other studies have shown the same pattern, in which a first act of self-control
diminishes the ability to engage in self-control on a second, unrelated, task, suggesting
that acts of self-control consume some quantity of self-regulatory resources and
temporarily impair the ability to self-regulate effectively, thus creating a state of ego
depletion in which the self is temporarily operating at less than full self-regulatory power.
Research has ruled out factors such as the recognition that the task as impossible,
the self-control task being more unpleasant than the control condition, the self-control act
inducing negative affect, and the perception that one has done enough to satisfy
experimental demands as alternate explanations for results found in ego depletion studies.
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This state of depletion can be alleviated through sleep, rest, and positive emotionality
(Baumeister, 2002). The ability to self-regulate can be improved over time through
regular exercise in self-control. Multiple studies have demonstrated that participants who
were assigned to engage in the regular practice of one of various forms of self-regulation,
such as engaging in physical exercise, regulating posture, speech control, or the use of
one’s nondominant hand, were found to have improved self-regulatory stamina, and thus
reduced susceptibility to ego depletion, on laboratory tasks compared with controls who
had not engaged in such regular practice (Masicampo & Baumeister, 2007). While
differences in self-regulatory strength have not been demonstrated as a result of such
practice, the possibility that strength could be improved through regular self-control
practice has been acknowledged theoretically (Baumeister, 2002).
The effects of meditation practice and mindfulness on self-regulation should be
examined for a number of reasons. Attentional control has long been recognized as
critical to the processes that underlie regulation of behavior, with dysregulation occurring
when internal signals are ignored, suppressed, or cognitively exaggerated (Shapiro &
Schwartz, 2000). The intentional cultivation of mindful attention may promote selfregulation by allowing for increased attentional sensitivity to psychological, somatic, and
environmental cues (Kabat-Zinn, 1982; Linehan, 1993a) or by encouraging awareness of
stimulus-response relationships previously associated with mindless, habitual, or
overlearned behavior (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007; Leary, Adams, & Tate, 2006).
Trait mindfulness has been found to correlate significantly with self-reports of ability to
self-regulate, goal setting, goal clarity, and a stronger intention-behavior relationship
(Baer et al., 2006; Chatzisarantis & Hagger, 2007; Kee & Wang, 2008; Lykins & Baer, in
press), while a mindfulness induction and the intentional direction of attention,
respectively, have been shown to lead to less automatized and habitual responding and to
the ability to override unwanted responses (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994;
Wenk-Sormaz, 2005), all suggestive of more effective self-regulation. Thus, a
preliminary link between mindfulness and self-regulation has been established.
As self-control abilities have been shown to be related to many aspects of positive
functioning (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004), it seems important to determine how
mindfulness-related concepts are related to the ability to self-regulate on behavioral tasks.
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Additionally, recent theoretical work has suggested that trait mindfulness may be related
to well-being because both are caused by the third variable of ability to successfully selfregulate and that mindfulness-based interventions may produce beneficial outcomes
because they ask participants to practice self-control and thus increase the general
capacity for self-regulation (Masicampo & Baumeister, 2007). However, no empirical
work thus far has actually examined how meditation practice or trait mindfulness relate to
one’s demonstrated ability to self-regulate. Thus, an investigation of this nature is
important practically and theoretically. As the deliberate direction of attention involves
self-regulation, the tasks involved in the current study should be ego-depleting. If
meditation practice cultivates the ability to direct attention mindfully while using fewer
central executive resources, then meditators should show higher performance on
attentional tasks and less evidence of ego depletion after completing these tasks than
nonmeditators. It is also possible that those with higher levels of mindfulness skills in the
absence of meditation experience will also experience less ego depletion from directing
attention mindfully.
In summary, the general aims of the proposed research are to investigate the
cognitive, emotional, and self-regulatory effects of mindfulness practice using non-selfreport methodology. The knowledge and practical applications that can be gained from
this investigation are important both conceptually and practically. First, this research can
further demonstrate how and the extent to which meditation affects cognitive and
emotional processes and will be the first investigation of this type to examine selfregulatory processes. It will additionally be the first investigation using behavioral
methodology to investigate the impact of trait mindfulness on cognitive, emotional, and
self-regulatory processes. These issues have far reaching implications regarding the
impact and potential uses of meditation or mindfulness-based interventions and trait
mindfulness, as well the validity of current conceptualizations of mindfulness.

Copyright © Emily Lauren Brown Lykins 2009
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Chapter Two
Methodology
Participants
Data were collected from three samples of participants: regular meditators (N =
33), age-matched nonmeditating controls (N = 33), and nonmeditating students (N = 32).
For the first set of primary questions of this research, the comparison of meditators and
nonmeditating controls on attentional processes, orientation to emotional experience, and
self-regulation, a power analysis based on the most relevant data found in the literature at
the time (Chambers et al., 2008; Lykins & Baer, in press; Valentine & Sweet, 1999) led
to an estimated effect size of d = .71, meaning 33 individuals per group were required to
adequately assess questions regarding meditation status (alpha = .05, power = .80).
Recruitment successfully filled this desired sample size. For the second set of primary
research questions, the examination of impact of trait mindfulness in the absence of
meditation experience, a power analysis based on relevant literature (Baer et al., 2006;
Lykins & Baer, in press) led to an estimated effect size of r = .34, meaning 60 total
nonmeditating individuals were required to adequately assess questions regarding impact
of trait mindfulness (alpha = .05, power = .80). Recruitment successfully filled this
desired sample size by combining the nonmeditating control and nonmeditating student
groups.
Participants were recruited through fliers (meditating group), listserv posts to
University employees (meditating and nonmeditating control groups), recruitment emails to meditators identified from past studies (meditating group), and the PSY 100
subject pool (meditating, nonmeditating control, and nonmeditating student groups). To
qualify for the meditating group, individuals were required to have been meditating
regularly (at least twice per week for 20 minutes each time) for at least one year in a
mindfulness-based tradition. To qualify for the nonmeditating control or student groups,
participants must have had no experience with mindfulness meditation. For the
meditating and nonmeditating control groups, participants contacted the researcher if
interested in the study and details of the research were provided. For meditating
participants who qualified, if he/she was still interested following receipt of detailed
study information, a study appointment was scheduled. Participants from the PSY 100
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subject pool were identified as potential participants for the meditating group only if they
reported adequate meditation experience on an initial screening form and if this
experience was confirmed at appointment. For potential participants for the
nonmeditating control group, following participant contact and the provision of study
details, a list of potential nonmeditating control participants was maintained and
participants were contacted to participate in the order of initial contact once matched with
a meditating participant within five years of age. For participants for the nonmeditating
student group, participants signed themselves up for the experiment based on standard
University procedures. Participants received either partial credit toward course
completion of required experimental hours or $50 for their participation.
Demographic characteristics of the meditating, nonmeditating control, and
nonmeditating student samples can be seen in Table 1. The meditating and nonmeditating
control groups only were compared for analyses examining the impact of meditation
experience, while the nonmeditating control and student groups only were used for
examination of the impact of trait mindfulness in the absence of meditation experience.
When comparing the meditating and nonmeditating control groups, the age-matched
samples did not differ significantly on age, t(64) = -0.02, ns, gender, χ²(1) = 0.99, ns,
minority status, χ²(1) = 0.22, ns, or years of completed education, t(64) = 0.91, ns. They
also did not differ on the proportion of group ever diagnosed with a psychological
disorder, χ²(1) = 0.23, ns, or currently diagnosed with a psychological disorder, χ²(1) =
0.84, ns. The meditating group was composed of 37% of individuals ever diagnosed with
a psychological disorder (15% currently diagnosed), while 31% of the nonmeditating
control group was ever diagnosed (21% currently diagnosed). For the meditating group,
22% of individuals reported ever being diagnosed with an anxiety disorder and 19%
reported a history of a mood disorder diagnosis. For the nonmeditating control group,
21% of individuals reported ever being diagnosed with an anxiety disorder, 21% with a
mood disorder, and 3% with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder.
The groups did, however, differ on the proportion of sample who currently
practice yoga (51.5% of the meditating group, 6.1% of the nonmeditating group, χ²(1) =
16.63, p < 001. This may not be a surprising finding, as yoga is commonly considered a
type of meditative practice. For those 17 meditators who currently practiced yoga, they
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reported an average of 59.53 (107.43) months of regular yoga practice, with an average
of 4.12 (3.72) sessions per week of a length of 46.76 (27.33) minutes per session. On a
scale from 1 (not at all similar) to 5 (very similar), they ranked the similarity of their
meditative and yoga practices as a 3.35 (1.27), on average.

Instruments
All study instruments have demonstrated adequate to good reliability and validity.
Measures of meditation experience and psychological functioning
Demographic questionnaire. The demographic questionnaire was designed for use
in this study. It asked participants to report their age, gender, race/ethnicity, and years of
education completed. Additionally, it asked participants to report whether they have ever
been diagnosed with a psychological disorder and, if so, the diagnosis and whether still
diagnosed. Regarding meditation experience, it asked participants to indicate whether
they have had any meditation experience, and if so, on the duration, frequency, and type
of meditation practice, as well as length of typical practice session. Finally, it asked
participants to indicate whether they have had any experience practicing yoga, and if so,
the duration, frequency, and length of typical yoga practice, as well as how similar the
yoga and meditation practices are (for meditators only).
Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006). The FFMQ was
used to assess five identified mindfulness facets, observing, describing, acting with
awareness, nonjudging, and nonreactivity. This 39-item self-report measure was derived
from a factor analysis of all available trait mindfulness questionnaires, identifying
common elements between multiple independent conceptualizations of the mindfulness
construct. The utility of examining multiple mindfulness facets has been supported (Baer
et al., 2007; Baer et al., 2006; Carmody & Baer, 2008). Consistent with previous
research, it was predicted that individuals with meditation experience would score higher
than those without on the FFMQ.
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993). The 21item, short-form version of the DASS was used to assess psychological symptoms,
including negative affect and bodily symptoms, using Likert ratings of symptoms over
the last week. The total score was used for all analyses. Consistent with past research
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findings (i.e., Lykins & Baer, in press), it was hypothesized that individuals with
meditation experience or possessing greater skills in mindfulness (trait mindfulness) in
the absence of meditation experience would have lower levels of psychological
symptoms than individuals without meditation experience or lower in mindfulness skills,
respectively.
Scales of Psychological Well-being (Scales of PWB; Ryff, 1989). This 18-item
short-form version of the 54-item self-report measure assesses six elements of wellbeing: self-acceptance (positive attitude toward one’s self, life, and past, including good
and bad qualities), positive relations with others (warm, satisfying, trusting relationships),
autonomy (independence, ability to resist social pressures and follow own standards),
environmental mastery (competence in managing life’s demands), purpose in life (goals
and direction, sense of meaning in life), and personal growth (view of self as growing and
developing, openness to new experiences). This instrument is based on a review of many
theories of psychological health (Ryff, 1989), which is often described as broader than
the absence of symptoms (Hayes et al., 1999; Keyes, 2007; Snyder & Lopez, 2002). The
total score, which sums the six elements of well-being, was used in this study, as
interpretation of individual subscales is not recommended for the 18-item version.
Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). The
RRQ is a 24-item measures that assesses the tendencies to ruminate and reflect.
Rumination, or neurotic self-attentiveness, is recurrent thinking about the self that is
motivated by perceived threat, loss, or injustice. Reflection, or intellectual selfattentiveness, is recurrent thinking about the self that is motivated by curiosity. These
constructs are believed to be meaningfully distinct due to their differential motives for
self-attentiveness.
Measures of cognitive functioning
Continuous Performance Task. A computerized continuous performance task
(CPT), adapted from the vigilance task of the Gordon Diagnostic System (1986) by
Lawrence et al. (2005), was used to assess vigilance, or the ability to detect brief and
unpredictable signals over time (Parasuraman & Davies, 1976). During the CPT, stimuli
were presented on a computer monitor positioned at eye level and included the numbers
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. The numbers were presented one at a time in white text on a
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dark background. Stimuli remained on the screen for 200 ms with an 800-ms interstimulus interval. The task included one block of 360 sequentially displayed stimuli over
6 minutes. The target sequence was the number 1 followed immediately by the number 9.
This sequence occurred 30 times at random intervals during the 360-stimulus block.
Participants were asked to respond to the target sequence using a button pressed with the
index finger of their dominant hand. The dependent variables included average response
time to target sequences (correct responses only) and number of omission or commission
errors. It was hypothesized that individuals with meditation experience or possessing
greater skills in mindfulness in the absence of meditation experience would have shorter
reaction times and would make fewer errors than individuals without meditation
experience or lower in mindfulness skills, respectively.
Ruff 2 & 7 Selective Attention Test (Ruff & Allen, 1996). The 2 & 7 Test is a
paper-and-pencil measure that was used to assess both sustained and selective visual
attention. Sustained attention is the ability to maintain attentional focus or alertness over
time, whereas selective attention is the ability to select relevant stimuli while ignoring
salient, or similar, but irrelevant stimuli (Mirsky, Anthony, Duncan, Ahearn, & Kellam,
1991). This test was administered and scored in accordance with the instructions in the 2
& 7 Test professional manual (Ruff & Allen, 1996). In this task, participants were asked
to mark target digits (2 and 7) by finding them among letters (automatic detection) or
other digits (controlled search). The task consisted of 20 blocks (10 blocks of digits only
and 10 blocks of both digits and letters). Each block contained three lines, in each of
which 10 targets were interspersed among 40 non-target items. The time to complete each
block was limited to 15 seconds. Three scores were computed and served as dependent
variables. The Total Speed score was calculated by adding the total target digits correctly
marked in all blocks. The Total Accuracy score, expressed as a percentage, was the Total
Speed score divided by the number of errors of omission and commission plus the Total
Speed score. The Processing score quantifies the difference between searching for digits
among letters and searching for digits among other digits. This score was computed using
the following formula: [Speed score in letter blocks — Errors in letter blocks]/[Speed
score in digit blocks - Errors in digit blocks]. The comparison of automatic detection
versus controlled processing assesses selective attention to external stimuli, or the ability
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to select relevant stimuli while ignoring irrelevant stimuli, with minimal demands on
internal processing of information or immediate memory. The higher the Processing
score, the more the participant benefited from searching for target digits among letters
versus numbers (Ruff, Niemann, Allen, Farrow, & Wylie, 1992). These scores were
corrected for age and education, in accordance with procedures described in the test’s
manual. It was hypothesized that individuals with meditation experience or possessing
greater skills in mindfulness in the absence of meditation experience would have higher
Total Speed, higher Total Accuracy, and lower Processing scores than individuals
without meditation experience or lower in mindfulness skills, respectively.
Color Trails Test (CTT; D'Elia, Satz, Uchiyama, & White, 1994). The Color
Trails Test is a paper-and-pencil task that was used to assess attention switching, or the
ability to shift the attentional focus in a flexible and goal-consistent manner (Mirsky et
al., 1991). The CTT is an adaptation of the Trails Making Test (TMT) from the Halstead–
Reitan Battery and has two parts. Color Trails A is a control task that involves searching
for and drawing a line between consecutive numbers presented individually in separate
yellow circles scattered over a single page. Color Trails B is a switching task that
involves searching for and connecting consecutive numbers presented individually in
alternating colors, with each number presented in each of the two colors. The completion
times and number of errors for Color Trails A and B and the difference between the
completion times (in seconds) for Trails A and B were recorded for all participants, and
the completion times were corrected for age and education. It was hypothesized that
individuals with meditation experience or possessing greater skills in mindfulness in the
absence of meditation experience would have shorter completion times, lower errors, and
a smaller difference between completion times for Trails A and B than individuals
without meditation experience or lower in mindfulness skills, respectively.
California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT; Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & Ober, 1987).
The CVLT is a well-known test of verbal learning and memory that was used to assess
attention, learning, and short- and long-term memory. A list of 16 words (List A) was
presented five times in succession, and subjects were instructed to recall as many words
as possible after each presentation of the word list. After five test trials of List A, a new
list of words (List B) was read to the subjects, who were instructed to recall as many
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words as possible from List B. Subjects were then asked to recall List A again (short
delay) and, after a 20-minute interval, were asked to recall List A (long delay). The
dependent variables for the current study included initial attention (number of words
recalled following Trial 1), total learning (sum of words recalled following Trials 1
through 5), and short- and long-term memory (number of words recalled following short
and long delays). Participant scores were corrected for age and gender according to
procedures in the manual. It was hypothesized that individuals with meditation
experience or possessing greater skills in mindfulness in the absence of meditation
experience will have higher initial attention, total learning, and short- and long-term
memory than individuals without meditation experience or lower in mindfulness skills,
respectively.
Letter-Number Sequencing (LNS; Wechsler, 1997). The Letter-Number
Sequencing subtest from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–III was used to assess
working memory. This test was administered and scored in accordance with the
instructions in the WAIS-III manual (Wechsler, 1997). The test involved oral
presentation by the examiner of sequences of letters and numbers. Participants were
asked to recall the items in each sequence, but not in the order they were presented.
Instead, they first named the numbers in ascending order and then the letters in
alphabetical order. Each sequence was slightly longer than the previously presented
sequence. The age-corrected scaled score transformed using WAIS-III norms served as
the dependent variable. It was hypothesized that individuals with meditation experience
or possessing greater skills in mindfulness in the absence of meditation experience would
have higher LNS scores than individuals without meditation experience or lower in
mindfulness skills, respectively.
Computerized subitizing task. The computerized subitizing task was used to
assess participant subitizing range. Subitizing is the rapid, parallel, and near-automatic
process (Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994) that allows people to immediately “see” or “grasp” the
total number of elements shown in a display, as long as the number of elements is very
small (i.e., not more than four elements). When the number of elements in the display is
larger than the maximum number that can be subitized by the individual (subitizing
range), enumeration can no longer occur in parallel, and the slower, presumably serial
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and controlled process of counting must be used. Multiple theorists in cognitive
psychology (Cowan, 2001; Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999) have claimed that the
subitizing range is an indicator of the size of an individual's focus of visual attention,
with a smaller subitizing range being indicative of a more narrow focus of attention and,
thus, a smaller capacity of short-term or working memory. As performance in tests of
working memory in the verbal domain rely on both working memory capacity and
chunking strategies while subitizing tasks rely on capacity only, performance on a
subitizing task can help clarify whether meditators’ superior performance on verbal
working memory tasks is due to increased working memory capacity or the use of
superior chunking strategies.
For the subitizing task, each trial began with a 1000 ms presentation of the word
“READY,” followed by a 20 ms blank interval and the presentation of a dot display. The
dot displays ranged from 1 to 8 total dots, arranged randomly within a square
presentation box. Each display (1 to 8 dots) was presented to each participant ten times.
The dot display was terminated as soon as the participant hit the response key to indicate
he/she knew the number of dots present. The “A” key was pressed to indicate that an odd
number of dots was present, while the “L” key was pressed to indicate the presence of an
even number of dots. Response times were recorded for correct responses, while the
response was counted as an error if the participant response is not correct for the
presented number of dots. The average response time to each dot presentation set (1 to 8)
and the increases in response times between two adjacent sets (i.e., the increase in
average response time between the presentation of 4 dots and 5 dots) were calculated and
compared across groups. It was hypothesized that individuals with meditation experience
or possessing greater skills in mindfulness in the absence of meditation experience would
have a larger subitizing range than individuals without meditation experience or lower in
mindfulness skills, respectively.
Stroop Color-Word Test (Stroop, 1935). The Stroop Color-Word Test was used to
assess inhibition of elaborative processing, or the ability to inhibit the automatic process
of reading printed words. A four-color version of the Stroop test was used in the current
study. This task included two conditions. First, participants were asked to hit the
appropriate color key, as fast as possible, to indicate the names of four colors (red, green,
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blue, yellow) printed in congruent-color ink (Congruent condition). Second, participants
were asked to hit the appropriate color key to name the ink color of words written in a
color different from the word's verbal content, such as the word blue written in red or the
word green written in yellow (Incongruent condition). One practice block (10 stimuli)
was completed by the participant at the beginning of each condition. The dependent
variables for each condition were the average reaction time for correct responses from the
50 presented stimuli and the total number of errors. An interference score was computed
by subtracting the average reaction time for the Congruent condition from the average
reaction time of the Incongruent condition. It was hypothesized that individuals with
meditation experience or possessing greater skills in mindfulness in the absence of
meditation experience would have shorter reaction times, fewer errors, and a smaller
interference score than individuals without meditation experience or lower in mindfulness
skills, respectively.
Measures of emotional functioning
Emotional Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). The emotional Stroop task was used to
assess inhibition of elaborative processing in the emotional domain. The emotional
Stroop task is an adaptation of the original Stroop task, where the color words are
replaced with emotional and neutral words. Multiple studies have demonstrated that
individuals take longer to color-name emotional, threat, or disorder-relevant words than
neutral words. While multiple explanations for Stroop-related phenomena exist (Harvey,
Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004), recent work (Bishop et al., 2004) has argued for the
utility of using the emotional Stroop task to assess mindfulness skills, as mindfulness
training should cultivate the ability to inhibit semantic/secondary elaborative processing
of the thoughts, feelings, and sensations that arise following confrontation with a
stimulus, which should lead to shorter latency and fewer mistakes in color-naming
emotional words in this paradigm. For the emotional Stroop task, participants were asked
to hit the appropriate color key, as fast as possible, to indicate the name of the ink color
of neutral words (Neutral condition). Second, participants were asked to hit the
appropriate color key, as fast as possible, to indicate the name of the ink color of
emotional words (Emotional condition). Negative emotional words, such as afraid,
depressed, and panic, were used with neutral words that were matched for length and
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frequency of use. One practice block (10 stimuli) was completed by the participant at the
beginning of each condition. The dependent variables for each condition were the
average reaction time for correct responses from the 50 presented stimuli and the total
number of errors. An emotional interference score was computed by subtracting the
average reaction time for the Neutral condition from the average reaction time of the
Emotional condition. Again, it was hypothesized that individuals with meditation
experience or possessing greater skills in mindfulness in the absence of meditation
experience would have shorter completion times, lower errors, and a smaller interference
score than individuals without meditation experience or lower in mindfulness skills,
respectively.
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The
IAT examines automatic, evaluative biases in the processing of information. The
underlying presumption is that when a task requires the same response (e.g., pressing a
particular key) to be used for two stimuli that are associated, response times should be
faster than when the same response is used for two unrelated stimuli. The IAT has been
successfully used to examine attitudes, personality factors, self-esteem, and other selfrelated concepts in multiple studies (i.e., De Hower & De Bruycker, 2007; Gemar, Segal,
Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001; Grumm & von Collani, 2007). As individuals higher in
mindfulness were proposed to be less fearful and avoidant of negative emotions (KabatZinn, 1990; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992; Linehan, 1993a, 1993b), the proposed IAT involved
the word categories of approach versus avoid (i.e., touch versus dodge) and the picture
categories of distressed versus neutral emotion (i.e., sorrow versus neutral).
Participants completed a total of five blocks during this task in the following
order: a words only block (approach versus avoid), a pictures only block (distressed
versus neutral), a compound block using both words and pictures, a second pictures only
block (distressed versus neutral), and a second compound block using both words and
pictures. Participants responded with either the “A” or “L” key to indicate to which of the
appropriate categories a word or picture belonged. In the compound blocks, a word and
picture category were combined with the same response key (approach with distressed
and avoid with neutral or vice versa), and all participants were presented with both
combinations. The categories that the “A” or “L” key were assigned, as well as the order
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of presentation of the compound blocks, was counterbalanced across participants. The
dependent variables for the IAT included the number of errors made in the “approach”
compound block (distress paired with approach), number of errors made in the “avoid”
compound block (distress paired with avoid), and a difference score computed by
subtracting the average reaction time for correct responses for the “avoid” compound
block from the average reaction time for correct responses for the “approach” block. This
difference score thus indicates how much longer it took participants to pair the distress
and approach concepts than the distress and avoid concepts and serves as a means to
measure avoidance and fear of negative emotions. It was hypothesized that individuals
with meditation experience or possessing greater skills in mindfulness in the absence of
meditation experience would pair the emotion/approach and the object/avoid words (the
mindfulness-consistent condition) more quickly and thus have a smaller difference score
than individuals without meditation experience or lower in mindfulness skills,
respectively (though they may still pair the object/approach words more quickly at an
absolute level).
Measure of self-regulatory functioning
Ego depletion task. In order to assess for ego depletion, participants completed a
two-step handgrip procedure demonstrated to measure ego depletion in multiple studies
(i.e., Martijn et al., 2007; Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007). Maintaining
handgrip requires physical stamina and self-control to resist the impulse to quit as one’s
hand grows tired and physical discomfort increases. Squeezing a handgrip requires a
great deal of effort, as one’s grip will loosen if exertion is broken for even one moment.
Prior research has demonstrated that maintaining a grip has little to do with general
bodily strength and is almost entirely a measure of self-control, with grip maintenance
time not loading onto a strength factor nor correlating with maximum grip strength
(Hejak, 1989; Muraven et al., 1998; Rethlingshafer, 1942; Thornton, 1939). Thus,
squeezing a handgrip is an ideal way to measure self-regulation (Muraven et al., 1998).
When participants first arrived, they completed a baseline measure of handgrip
stamina. The apparatus was a commercially available hand exerciser consisting of two
handles and a metal spring. Participants were told to squeeze the handles together and
maintain that grip for as long as they could. A paperclip was inserted between the far
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ends of the handles so that when the grip was relaxed (under pressure from the spring),
the paperclip fell out and thereby furnished a clear and objective signal to stop timing.
The experimenter timed and recorded how long the participant successfully squeezed the
handles. Following the rest of the experimental procedure, the handgrip stamina task was
completed again. The individual change in handgrip stamina (in seconds) was calculated
by subtracting each participant’s baseline performance from their final performance and
served as the dependent variable measuring ego depletion. Each of the current behavioral
measures involves some aspect of executive control or self-regulation in addition to the
ostensibly measured construct and, thus, should be ego depleting. The recognized
paradigm of measuring self-control abilities after ego depletion (or comparing pre- and
post-performance in the case of handgrip measurement) is a well-rccognized and
validated way of assessing ego depletion. It was hypothesized that individuals with
meditation experience or possessing greater skills in mindfulness in the absence of
meditation experience would evidence less of a decrease in handgrip stamina than would
individuals without meditation experience or lower in mindfulness skills, respectively.

Procedure
Participants who arrived for a scheduled assessment immediately provided
informed consent to participate. Participants completed the assessment in individual
sessions on the University of Kentucky campus (either in a research laboratory in
Breckinridge Hall or in an assessment room at the Jesse G. Harris Psychological Services
Center). The assessment was administered verbally, by hand, and by computer. During
the assessment session, participants completed the questionnaires and tasks outlined
previously. The initial handgrip stamina task, demographic questionnaire, FFMQ, and
CVLT (up through long delay recall) were administered first for all participants, and the
handgrip stamina end task was administered last for all participants. The CVLT (long
delay recall), 2 & 7 Test, CPT, CTT, LNS, computerized subitizing task, Stroop tasks,
and IAT presentation order was counterbalanced, with the CVLT (long delay recall) task
being completed after an approximate 20 minute delay. The assessment session required
approximately 75 minutes of participation.
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In order to ensure participant confidentiality, the following procedures were
followed. During the assessment, each participant was assigned an ID number. All data
from each participant was identified by ID number only, with signed consent forms being
stored separately from study data. Once payment was made to each participant at the end
of the assessment session, all identifying information about that participant was
destroyed, unless participants provided contact information and consent to contact them
about future research opportunities. In this case, contact information was stored
separately from study data. All data were stored by participant number only in a locked
filing cabinet in the PI’s office at the University of Kentucky, Department of Psychology.
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Chapter Three
Results
Differences between the meditating and demographically matched nonmeditating
groups were examined using a series of multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA),
which control for interrelationships among dependent variables and reduces the
probability of Type I error. Dependent variables were grouped into logical categories and
a MANOVA was conducted for each category. These categories included self-reported
mindfulness (FFMQ), self-report measures of psychological functioning (DASS, PWB,
and RRQ), behavioral measures of attention (CPT, Ruff 2 & 7 Selective Attention Test,
CVLT List A, and CTT), behavioral measures of learning and memory (CVLT and LNS),
behavioral measure of subitizing range (computerized subitizing task), behavioral
measures of cognitive and emotional biases (Stroop Color-Word Test, Emotional Stroop
task, and IAT), and behavioral measures of self-regulation (ego depletion task). These
analyses included 33 individuals each from the meditating and nonmeditating control
groups unless otherwise stated. In the case of a significant MANOVA, follow-up
univariate ANOVAs were conducted to see which individual variables contributed to the
overall difference, and effect sizes (Cohen’s d) were computed. All analyses examining
the impact of trait mindfulness in the absence of meditation experience (using data from
the nonmeditation control and student groups) were conducted using correlational
analyses and had a total sample size of N = 65. As 45 correlations were computed, a
conservative alpha level of .01 was used.
Relationships of meditation experience and mindfulness. Pillai’s Trace for the
MANOVA examining self-reported mindfulness (FFMQ total and facet scores) was 0.46,
F(5, 60) = 10.02, p < .001, indicating that participants in the meditating and
nonmeditating control groups reported significantly different scores. Follow-up
univariate ANOVAs revealed that, as predicted, meditators scored significantly higher
than the nonmeditating controls on FFMQ total score, F(1, 60) = 45.72, p < .001, and on
each facet score, including the observe, F(1, 60) = 32.77, p < .001, describe, F(1, 60) =
17.60, p < .001, act with awareness, F(1, 60) = 8.79, p < .01, nonjudge, F(1, 60) = 9.20, p
< .01, and nonreact, F(1, 60) = 11.99, p < .01, facets. These results can be found in Table
2. Most effect sizes for the group comparisons were large (absolute values ranging from
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.73 to 1.66). These findings replicated past findings showing higher levels of selfreported mindfulness among experienced meditators than among nonmeditators.
In order to further examine the relationship between meditation experience and
self-reported levels of mindfulness, correlations were computed between months of
meditation experience and FFMQ mindfulness scores in the meditating group only.
Months of meditation experience did not correlate significantly with any of the FFMQ
facet scores or total score: r = .14, ns (observe), r = -.01, ns (describe), r = .02, ns (act
with awareness), r = .28, ns (nonjudge), r = .19, ns (nonreact), and r = .24, ns (total
score). Thus, these analyses do not replicate previous findings showing significant
correlations between levels of mindfulness and extent of meditation experience.
Relationships of meditation experience and psychological functioning. Results for
analyses examining the relationships between meditation experience and self-reported
psychological functioning can be found in Table 2. Pillai’s Trace for the psychological
functioning MANOVA (DASS, PWB, and RRQ) was 0.51, F(4, 61) = 16.13, p < .001,
indicating that participants in the meditating and nonmeditating control groups reported
significantly different scores for this group of variables. Follow-up univariate ANOVAs
revealed that, as predicted, meditators scored significantly lower on rumination, F(1, 61)
= 9.08, p < .01, and higher on reflection, F(1, 61) = 39.12, p < .001, than did the
nonmeditating controls. The effect sizes for these findings were large (absolute values of
.74 and 1.54) and replicated past findings.
However, contrary to predictions, the meditators did not score lower than the
nonmeditating controls on self-reported psychological symptoms (DASS score), F(1, 61)
= 0.92, ns, or higher on a measure of psychological well-being (Scales of PWB score),
F(1, 61) = 3.61, ns. On the DASS, both groups fell above the mean total score
previously reported for a large nonclinical community sample, with the meditating and
nonmeditating control group samples falling at approximately the 65th and 73rd
percentiles, respectively (Henry & Crawford, 2005). As no significant differences were
found between the meditators and nonmeditating controls on psychological symptoms,
which could be expected to exert an impact on behavioral measures of cognitive,
emotional, or self-regulatory functioning, subsequent analyses examining the impact of
meditation experience do not control for psychological symptoms.
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Relationships of meditation experience and attention. Data from only 32
meditators were included in the attention MANOVA, as data was missing from one
meditator who reported failing to understand CPT task instructions. Pillai’s Trace for the
attention MANOVA (CPT, Ruff 2 & 7 Selective Attention Test, CVLT List A, and CTT)
was 0.14, F(11, 53) = 0.79, ns, indicating that participants in the meditating and
nonmeditating control groups did not score significantly differently on these measures of
attention. Thus, follow-up univariate ANOVAs for the individual behavioral measures of
attention were not conducted. Means and standard deviations by group and effect sizes
for the attention measures can be found in Table 3.
Relationships of meditation experience and learning and memory. Pillai’s Trace
for the learning and memory MANOVA (CVLT and LNS) was 0.22, F(6, 59) = 2.75, p.<
.05, indicating that participants in the meditating and nonmeditating control groups
scored significantly differently on this group of measures. Follow-up univariate
ANOVAs revealed that, as predicted, meditators scored significantly higher on two
measures of short-term memory (CVLT short delay free recall, F(1, 59) = 6.25, p < .05;
short delay cued recall, F(1, 59) = 6.32, p < .05) and one measure of long-term memory
(long delay free recall, F(1, 59) = 6.02, p < .05). Contrary to predictions, however, they
did not score higher on a second index of long-term memory (long delay cued recall, F(1,
59) = 3.79, ns), on working memory (LNS standard score, F(1, 59) = 2.28, ns), or on total
learning (CVLT, F(1, 59) = 1.07, ns). Results for analyses examining the relationships
between meditation experience and learning and memory can be found in Table 4.
Relationships of meditation experience and subitizing range. Pillai’s Trace for the
subitizing MANOVA (computerized subitizing task) was 0.11, F(8, 57) = 0.87, ns,
indicating that participants in the meditating and nonmeditating control groups did not
score significantly differently on this measure of subitizing range. Thus, follow-up
univariate ANOVAs for the individual subitizing variables were not conducted. Means
and standard deviations by group and effect sizes for the measure of subitizing range can
be found in Table 5. It is worth noting that both groups had the largest increase in
response times between the adjacent 4 and 5 dot sets, consistent with the typical capacity
for visual working memory (Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994).
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Relationships of meditation experience and cognitive and emotional biases. Data
from only 32 meditators were included in the cognitive and emotional biases MANOVA,
as one meditator reported being yellow/green colorblind and thus did not complete the
two Stroop tasks. Pillai’s Trace for the cognitive and emotional biases MANOVA
(Stroop Color-Word Test, emotional Stroop task, and IAT) was 0.28, F(11, 53) = 1.85,
ns, indicating that participants in the meditating and nonmeditating control groups did not
score significantly differently on a composite of measures of cognitive and emotional
biases. Thus, follow-up univariate ANOVAs for the individual cognitive and emotional
biases measures were not conducted. Means and standard deviations by group and effect
sizes for these measures can be found in Table 6.
Relationship of meditation experience and self-regulatory functioning. Data from
only 32 meditators were included in the self-regulatory functioning MANOVA, as one
meditator reported suffering from arthritis in her hands and was excluded from analyses.
Pillai’s Trace for the self-regulatory functioning MANOVA (initial and final handgrip
and difference score) was 0.15, F(2, 62) = 5.41, p.< .01, indicating that participants in the
meditating and nonmeditating control groups scored significantly differently on this set
of measures. Follow-up univariate ANOVAs revealed that, contrary to predictions,
meditators did not have a significantly smaller difference score than did the
nonmeditators, F(1, 62) = 0.64, ns, suggesting that they, as a group, did not experience
less ego depletion than did the nonmeditators. These results were further confirmed in a 2
x 2 repeated measures analysis of variance, which demonstrated that there was no
interaction between group and time in handgrip performance, F(63) = 0.64, ns. Neither
group had even a moderate performance decrement from the initial to final evaluation of
handgrip stamina, suggesting that neither group experienced significant ego depletion
from the intervening tasks. The meditators did, however, evidence significantly longer
handgrip performance at both the initial, F(1, 62) = 5.44, p < .05, and final, F(1, 62) =
10.40, p < .01, handgrip tasks. Results for analyses examining the relationships between
meditation experience and self-regulatory functioning can be found in Table 7.
Despite the fact that handgrip endurance has been shown to measure selfregulation with little influence from physical strength, the practice of yoga may be
reasonably hypothesized to lead to specific increases in handgrip strength and/or
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endurance. As the meditating group included a significantly higher proportion of
individuals who practice yoga, their higher average performance may reasonably be
hypothesized to be due to their yoga practice. As only three individuals who reported
engaging in yoga practice were nonmeditators (two in the demographic control and 1 in
the nonmeditating student group), a comparison of handgrip performance in the
meditating individuals who either practice or do not practice yoga was conducted. The 17
meditating participants who reported yoga practice did not differ from the 16 who
reported no yoga practice on handgrip performance at the initial (M = 90.45 (46.78)
versus 78.09 (50.99), respectively, t(30) = 0.72, ns) or final evaluation (M = 83.65
(38.69) versus 87.13 (52.82), respectively, t(30) = -0.21, ns), suggesting that yoga
practice does not lead to improvements in handgrip performance beyond that produced by
meditation practice.
Relationships of mindfulness skills and psychological functioning. Results for
analyses examining the relationships between self-reported mindfulness skills and
psychological functioning in the absence of meditation experience can be found in Table
8. In order to examine these relationships, the correlations between mindfulness skills
(FFMQ total score), psychological symptoms (DASS), psychological well-being (Scales
of PWB), rumination (RRQ), and reflection (RRQ) were computed for the total sample of
nonmeditators (nonmeditating controls and students). FFMQ total score was significantly
related to psychological well-being, r = .58, p < .001, but was not significantly related to
psychological symptoms, r = -.30, ns, rumination, r = -0.19, ns, or reflection, r = 0.02, ns.
Relationships of mindfulness skills and cognitive, emotional, and self-regulatory
functioning. Results for analyses examining the relationships between mindfulness skills
and cognitive and emotional functioning in the absence of meditation experience can also
be found in Table 8. Contrary to predictions, in the nonmeditating sample, self-reported
mindfulness skills (FFMQ total score and individual facet scores) did not significantly
correlate with any of the measures of cognitive, emotional, or self-regulatory functioning.
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TABLE 3.1
Demographic Characteristics of Participants
Meditators
33
N
Age in years
35.24 (13.87)
Mean (SD)
18-62
Range
48.5%
% male
93.9%
% Caucasian
Years of education
16.64 (3.11)
Mean (SD)
Proportion of
37.0%
group ever
diagnosed with a
mental disorder
Proportion of
14.8%
group currently
diagnosed with a
mental disorder
Months of
74.26 (79.67)
meditation
practice
Average
5.42 (3.92)
meditation
sessions per week
Average minutes
30.30 (17.41)
per meditation
session
Proportion of
51.5%
group currently
practicing yoga
Note: SD = standard deviation
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Nonmeditating
Controls
33

Nonmeditating
Students
32

35.30 (14.59)
18-64
36.4%
90.9%

18.94 (1.01)
18-22
31.3%
96.9%

15.97 (2.82)

13.03 (0.74)

31.0%

17.6%

20.7%

5.9%

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

6.1%

3.1%

TABLE 3.2
Mean Scores, Standard Deviations, Univariate F Ratios, and Cohen’s d Values for
Self-Report Measures of Mindfulness and Psychological Functioning by Group
Meditators
Mean (SD)

Nonmeditating
Controls
Mean (SD)

F

Effect size
(Cohen’s d)

Mindfulness variables
Observe
33.85 (4.22)
27.67 (4.55)
32.77***
1.41
Describe
32.33 (5.26)
26.85 (5.36)
17.60***
1.03
Act with awareness
29.73 (5.51)
25.91 (4.93)
8.79**
0.73
Nonjudge
31.36 (6.34)
26.97 (5.39)
9.20**
0.75
Nonreact
25.58 (4.07)
22.06 (4.18)
11.99**
0.85
Total
152.85 (13.53)
129.45 (14.56)
45.72***
1.66
Psychological
functioning variables
Symptoms (DASS)
9.97 (8.66)
11.76 (6.26)
0.92
0.24
Well-being (PWB)
89.24 (9.79)
84.64 (9.92)
3.61
0.47
Rumination (RRQ)
33.42 (10.72)
40.73 (8.89)
9.08**
0.74
Reflection (RRQ)
49.36 (7.78)
37.79 (7.25)
39.12***
1.54
Note: SD = standard deviation, DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales, PWB = Scales
of Psychological Well-being, RRQ = Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire, *** = p <
.001, ** = p < .01
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TABLE 3.3
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for Behavioral Measures of Attention by
Group
Meditators
Mean (SD)

Nonmeditating
Controls
Mean (SD)

Effect Size
Cohen’s d

Vigilance
CPT average RT
187.51 (71.27)
170.82 (58.47)
0.26
CPT # errors
0.84 (1.25)
1.55 (2.35)
0.38
Sustained attention
2 & 7 Total Speed T-score
51.00 (11.98)
49.48 (9.27)
0.14
2 & 7 Total Accuracy T49.69 (9.98)
48.39 (7.39)
0.15
score
Selective attention
2 & 7 Processing Score
1.69 (3.99)
1.13 (0.29)
0.20
Initial attention
CVLT List A T-score
-0.34 (1.21)
-0.42 (1.03)
0.07
Attention switching
CTT Trail A RT T-score
54.91 (7.97)
51.70 (10.07)
0.35
CTT Trail A # errors
0.13 (0.34)
0.06 (0.35)
0.20
CTT Trail B RT T-score
58.16 (7.21)
56.15 (6.73)
0.29
CTT Trail B # color errors
0.13 (0.42)
0.18 (0.46)
0.11
CTT Trail B # number
0.06 (0.25)
0.03 (0.17)
0.14
errors
Difference in Trails A and
3.25 (5.52)
4.45 (7.95)
0.18
B RTs
Note: SD = standard deviation, RT = reaction time, CPT = Continuous Performance
Task, 2 & 7 = Ruff 2 & 7 Selective Attention Test, CVLT = California Verbal Learning
Test, CTT = Color Trails Test
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TABLE 3.4
Mean Scores, Standard Deviations, Univariate F Ratios, and Cohen’s d Values for
Behavioral Measures of Learning and Memory by Group
Meditators

Nonmeditating
Controls
Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

F

Effect size
(Cohen’s d)

Learning
CVLT total learning
46.06 (15.37)
42.39 (13.32)
1.07
0.26
Working memory
LNS scaled score
11.73 (2.13)
10.82 (2.73)
2.28
0.37
Short- and long-term
memory
CVLT short-delay free
-0.03 (1.51)
-1.00 (1.64)
6.25*
0.62
recall
CVLT short-delay cued
-0.15 (1.33)
-1.00 (1.41)
6.32*
0.62
recall
CVLT long-delay free
-0.24 (1.37)
-1.12 (1.54)
6.02*
0.60
recall
CVLT long-delay cued
-0.55 (1.35)
-1.21 (1.43)
3.79
0.47
recall
Note: SD = standard deviation, CVLT = California Verbal Learning Test, LNS = LetterNumber Sequencing, * = p < .05
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TABLE 3.5
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for Behavioral Measure of Subitizing Range
by Group
Meditators
Mean (SD)
774.08 (194.39)
862.15 (171.90)
857.08 (184.52)
1078.09 (252.22)
1481.79 (352.84)
1726.78 (349.95)
1994.69 (388.73)
2286.80 (510.88)
88.08 (114.57)

Average RT: 1 dot set
Average RT: 2 dot set
Average RT: 3 dot set
Average RT: 4 dot set
Average RT: 5 dot set
Average RT: 6 dot set
Average RT: 7 dot set
Average RT: 8 dot set
Increase in RT: 1 to 2 dot
set
Increase in RT: 2 to 3 dot
-5.07 (104.79)
set
Increase in RT: 3 to 4 dot
221.01 (149.65)
set
Increase in RT: 4 to 5 dot
403.70 (193.99)
set
Increase in RT: 5 to 6 dot
244.99 (210.36)
set
Increase in RT: 6 to 7 dot
267.92 (214.50)
set
Increase in RT: 7 to 8 dot
292.11 (369.39)
set
Note: SD = standard deviation, RT = reaction time
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Nonmeditating
Controls
Mean (SD)
744.40 (137.79)
875.87 (178.31)
912.63 (272.12)
1135.77 (320.53)
1545.02 (307.86)
1786.41 (370.37)
2096.80 (309.40)
2308.32 (509.66)
131.47 (117.80)

Effect Size

36.76 (151.81)

0.32

223.15 (189.66)

0.01

409.25 (196.93)

0.03

241.39 (193.72)

0.02

310.39 (249.07)

0.18

211.52 (332.22)

0.23

Cohen’s d
0.18
0.08
0.24
0.20
0.19
0.17
0.29
0.04
0.37

TABLE 3.6
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations, Univariate F Ratios, and Cohen’s d Values
for Behavioral Measures of Cognitive and Emotional Biases by Group
Meditators
Mean (SD)

Nonmeditating
Controls
Mean (SD)

Effect Size
Cohen’s d

Inhibition of elaborative
processing
Color Stroop: Congruent RT 753.54 (159.08)
752.96 (127.47)
0.00
Color Stroop: Congruent
0.41 (0.71)
0.27 (0.57)
0.22
errors
Color Stroop: Incongruent
875.82 (241.44)
917.02 (195.05)
0.19
RT
Color Stroop: Incongruent
0.53 (1.19)
1.06 (1.37)
0.41
errors
Color Stroop: Interference
122.29 (179.04)
164.06 (116.61)
0.28
score
Emo Stroop: Neutral RT
767.54 (148.25)
782.91 (139.36)
0.11
Emo Stroop: Neutral errors
0.59 (0.95)
0.67 (0.92)
0.09
Emo Stroop: Emotional RT
813.13 (166.10)
801.89 (132.06)
0.07
Emo Stroop: Emotional
0.84 (0.99)
0.48 (0.76)
0.41
errors
Emo Stroop: Interference
45.59 (101.34)
18.98 (67.29)
0.31
score
Orientation to emotion
IAT “approach” block errors
2.03 (1.96)
3.67 (4.60)
0.46
IAT “avoid” block errors
1.50 (1.16)
2.00 (1.75)
0.34
IAT difference score
426.10 (483.23)
386.44 (393.09)
0.09
Note: SD = standard deviation, RT = reaction time, Color Stroop = Stroop Color-Word
Test, Emo Stroop = emotional Stroop task, IAT = Implicit Association Test
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TABLE 3.7
Mean Scores, Standard Deviations, Univariate F Ratios, and Cohen’s d Values for
Behavioral Measures of Self-Regulation by Group
Meditators
Mean (SD)
84.66 (48.40)
85.28 (45.11)
-0.63 (52.53)

Nonmeditating
F
Controls
Mean (SD)
58.21 (42.98)
5.44*
50.11 (42.81) 10.40**
8.09 (33.60)
0.64

Initial handgrip (secs)
Final handgrip (secs)
Handgrip difference score
(secs)
Note: SD = standard deviation, secs = seconds, ** = p < .01, * = p < .05
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Effect size
(Cohen’s d)
0.58
0.80
0.20

TABLE 3.8
Correlations of Self-Reported Mindfulness Skills (FFMQ Total Scores) with SelfReport Measures of Psychological Functioning and Behavioral Measures of
Cognitive, Emotional, and Self-Regulatory Functioning in Nonmeditators
r-value
Psychological functioning variables
Symptoms (DASS)
Well-being (PWB)
Rumination (RRQ)
Reflection (RRQ)
Cognitive functioning variables
Vigilance
CPT average RT
CPT # errors
Sustained attention
2 & 7 Total Speed T-score
2 & 7 Total Accuracy T-score
Selective attention
2 & 7 Processing Score
Initial attention
CVLT List A T-score
Attention switching
CTT Trail A RT T-score
CTT Trail A # errors
CTT Trail B RT T-score
CTT Trail B # color errors
CTT Trail B # number errors
Difference in Trails A and B RTs
Learning
CVLT total learning
Working memory
LNS scaled score
Short- and long-term memory
CVLT short-delay free recall
CVLT short-delay cued recall
CVLT long-delay free recall
CVLT long-delay cued recall
Subitizing range
Average RT: 1 dot set
Average RT: 2 dot set
Average RT: 3 dot set
Average RT: 4 dot set

-0.30
0.58***
-0.19
0.02
-0.14
0.00
0.10
0.02
-0.08
0.10
0.06
0.07
0.02
0.10
0.00
-0.06
0.01
0.23
-0.06
0.02
-0.02
0.08
-0.15
-0.09
-0.09
0.01
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TABLE 3.8 (continued)
Average RT: 5 dot set
0.00
Average RT: 6 dot set
-0.04
Average RT: 7 dot set
-0.08
Average RT: 8 dot set
-0.07
Increase in RT: 1 to 2 dot set
0.05
Increase in RT: 2 to 3 dot set
-0.03
Increase in RT: 3 to 4 dot set
0.12
Increase in RT: 4 to 5 dot set
-0.01
Increase in RT: 5 to 6 dot set
-0.07
Increase in RT: 6 to 7 dot set
-0.04
Increase in RT: 7 to 8 dot set
-0.02
Inhibition of elaborative processing
(Stroop)
Color: Congruent RT
-0.07
Color: Congruent errors
-0.04
Color: Incongruent RT
0.03
Color: Incongruent errors
0.08
Color: Interference score
0.08
Emotional functioning variables
Inhibition of elaborative processing –
Emotional (Stroop)
Emotional: Neutral RT
0.08
Emotional: Neutral errors
0.14
Emotional: Emotional RT
0.00
Emotional: Emotional errors
0.01
Emotional: Interference score
-0.20
Orientation to emotion
IAT “approach” block errors
0.19
IAT “avoid” block errors
-0.01
IAT difference score
0.16
Self-regulatory functioning variables
Ego depletion
Handgrip performance: initial
0.15
Handgrip performance: final
0.00
Handgrip difference score
0.20
Note: SD = standard deviation, RT = reaction time, CPT = Continuous Performance
Task, 2 & 7 = Ruff 2 & 7 Selective Attention Test, CTT = Color Trails Test, LNS =
Letter-Number Sequencing, CVLT = California Verbal Learning Test, Color = Stroop
Color-Word Test, Emotional = emotional Stroop task, IAT = Implicit Association Test,
*** = p < .001
Copyright © Emily Lauren Brown Lykins 2009

35

Chapter Four
Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to investigate differences between regular
meditators and demographically similar nonmeditators on cognitive, emotional, and selfregulatory variables measured with non-self-report methodology and to examine
correlations between self-reported trait mindfulness and behavioral measures in
nonmeditators. On the whole, meditation experience was demonstrated to relate to very
few of the cognitive, emotional, and self-regulatory constructs examined here. The only
significant group differences found in analyses examining impact of meditation
experience were in measures of short- and long-term memory and self-regulatory
strength. Self-reported mindfulness skills in the nonmeditating samples were related to
well-being but not to psychological symptoms or any of the cognitive, emotional, or selfregulatory tasks. These results stand in stark contrast to most of the current literature on
meditation and mindfulness suggesting that mindfulness skills are enhanced through
meditation practice or mindfulness-based interventions and that these skills are related to
many cognitive, emotional, and physical benefits. A variety of explanations are possible
for this notable divergence.
A first possible explanation is that, as previous theory and research suggest,
meditation practice and trait mindfulness skills do indeed relate to observable and
measurable changes or differences in cognitive, emotional, and self-regulatory
functioning but that the behavioral measures used in the current study fail to validly
measure the intended constructs. While this possibility cannot be thoroughly ruled out,
the measures used in the current study are commonly used intellectual (Letter-Number
Sequencing), neuropsychological (Ruff 2 & 7 Selective Attention Test, Color Trails Test,
California Verbal Learning Test), cognitive (Continuous Performance Task,
Computerized subitizing task, Stroop Color-Word Test, emotional Stroop task, Implicit
Association Test), and self-regulatory (ego depletion task) measures or paradigms with
considerable research attesting to their validity in measuring the respective constructs.
Extreme care was taken to design and/or administer the behavioral measures consistent
with the respective administration manual or with procedures commonly used in previous
research. Thus, this explanation for the findings does not appear likely.
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A contrasting possibility is that meditation practice and trait mindfulness are not
related to differences or changes in emotional and cognitive functioning as previously
theorized, suggesting that the previous conceptualizations of mindfulness and its
expected effects need significant revision. While many studies have suggested clinically
significant changes from meditation practice or mindfulness-based interventions, it is
possible that these effects are due to demand effects, especially given the fact that the
effects that practice “should” produce are commonly discussed during the administration
of an intervention or in the course of adopting a meditation practice (i.e., through
readings or discussion with meditation teachers). Alternately, previous studies examining
meditators and controls may have found group differences due to a failure in matching,
such as a difference by group in personality, age, or intelligence. For trait mindfulness
studies, significant relationships between mindfulness and related concepts may actually
be caused by an unmeasured third variable, such as self-regulatory strength (Masicampo
& Baumeister, 2007). Thus, the previously proposed effects of mindfulness and
meditation practice in the cognitive and emotional domains may need to be reexamined.
However, no valid means for measuring psychological symptoms and well-being
currently exist apart from self-report, and the results of a very large number of studies
would have to be alternately explained to feel confident in the assertion that mindfulness
does not exert beneficial effects. As the abundance of previous research suggests that
meditation practice and trait mindfulness relate to enhanced psychological functioning,
the results of one study should not be asserted as compelling evidence to the contrary.
Another possible explanation contrary to some of the currently accepted
conceptualizations of mindfulness is that mindfulness is a state that must be induced and
that the meditating group’s performance was not elevated across most domains in the
current study because we did not ask them to enter a mindful state while completing the
tasks. However, the fact that individuals are able to report on how “mindful” they are in
the absence of any meditation experience or even awareness of the concept of
mindfulness combined with the strong evidence supporting the construct validity of these
reports runs counter to this notion. Additionally, all participants were aware that the study
was examining the effects of meditation experience and mindfulness. Thus, the
assumption that individuals with meditation experience were attempting to complete the
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tasks mindfully is reasonable. Finally, the fact that a few performance-based differences
were found between the groups also runs counter to this explanation. If mindfulness is a
state that must be entered into and participants in this study did not enter it, then we
would likely not have found results for handgrip endurance or memory given the very
high degree of matching between the meditating and nonmeditating control groups. Thus,
this explanation also seems relatively unlikely.
A variety of alternate explanations for the current results falling somewhere
between these extreme positions are also plausible. For example, it is possible that the
practice of mindfulness meditation and the cultivation of mindfulness skills are related to
different attentional processes or to a narrower range of cognitive and emotional
processes than has been previously theorized and was assessed here. Previous research
(Jha et al., 2007; Tang et al., 2007) has demonstrated that mindfulness practice leads to
increased alerting (improvements in achieving and maintaining an alert state), orienting
(directing and limiting attention), and conflict monitoring (prioritizing among competing
demands), and it is possible that these types of differences related to trait mindfulness or
changes related to meditation practice are not captured in the current tasks. If this is the
case, the currently accepted conceptualization of mindfulness would require some
amount of revision, as the measures in the current study mapped onto the conceptual
hypotheses asserted by Bishop et al. (2004) very closely. However, this explanation also
seems relatively unlikely as changes in performance on tasks of the sort included in the
current research have been found in previous studies (i.e., Chambers et al., 2008;
Valentine & Sweet, 1999; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). Additionally, changes in more narrow
or specific attentional abilities would likely affect performance on the cognitive and
emotional tasks included in the current research, as many aspects of downstream
cognitive functioning are largely dependent upon present moment direction of attention
(Cowan, 1997). It may also be possible that meditation practice or higher trait
mindfulness is related to enhanced quality of attention, even if the amount of attentional
control does not change. The fact that the meditators were found to have superior
performance on measures of short- and long-term memory when compared with controls
despite having equivalent performance in attention and learning may be supportive of this
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notion. The relationships of meditation and mindfulness with attentional quality should
be examined more fully in future research.
An additional possible explanation for the current results may be that an
unanticipated difference in motivation to perform at one’s highest level of capability
exists between meditators and nonmeditators. As no performance-based incentives were
offered for quality of performance on the tasks, internal motivation to perform would be
the only factor strongly influencing participants’ approach to the tasks. Research suggests
that individuals with higher levels of mindfulness have more stable and less contingent
self-esteem, meaning that feelings of self-worth are not highly vulnerable to challenge
and processes that promote excessive self-protection or self-promotion are unnecessary
(Heppner & Kernis, 2007). Additionally, increased mindfulness is theorized to reduce the
level of distress associated with perceived self-discrepancies through nonjudgmental
acceptance of discrepancy-related thoughts and the perception of internal experiences as
transitory mental events that do not necessitate particular behaviors (Bogels, Sijbers, &
Voncken, 2006; Segal et al., 2002). These combined factors may have produced the
surprising effect of minimizing striving toward optimal performance in the meditating
group. Clinical observations by the experimenter did suggest that the meditating group
may not have felt the same performance-based pressure as did the nonmeditating
participants. Many nonmeditating controls and students were observed to make selfcritical statements regarding their own performance and to become distressed when they
viewed their own performance as insufficient. In contrast, self-critical comments and
signs of distress about performance were rarely observed in the meditating sample. These
feelings of distress in the nonmeditators may have served as a motivational factor to
increase short-term effort in this group, which may have masked existing group
differences. A related possibility is that the meditators responded differently to timed
tasks than did the controls. As the meditators knew the study was examining the effects
of meditation, which is often associated with emotional balance and less of a stressed
orientation, the meditators may not have experienced time pressure in the same manner as
did the controls. Given that most of the tasks in this study involved some element of
timing, this possibility is not insignificant. Both of these potential explanations bear
further investigation.
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An additional possible explanation for the current study findings may be that the
known groups paradigm utilized in this study was unable to detect differences or changes
in functioning related to trait mindfulness or meditation practice because this particular
group of meditating individuals was unrepresentative of typical samples of meditators
studied in previous research. For example, they may have had higher levels of
psychological distress. While the self-reported psychological symptoms (DASS scores)
experienced by meditators and nonmeditators in the present study were not in the clinical
range, they were not significantly different from each other and both groups fell above
the nonclinical mean from a standardization study (Henry & Crawford, 2005), with the
meditating group falling at the 65th percentile. Meditators in a previous study (Lykins &
Baer, in press) were found to have psychological symptom scores (DASS long form) that
were significantly lower than that of the nonmeditators and which fell at the 45th
percentile. Unfortunately, other studies utilizing a similar known-groups design in which
meditators were compared with nonmeditators (i.e., Jha et al., 2007; Massion, Teas,
Hebert, Wertheimer, & Kabat-Zinn, 1995; Valentine & Sweet, 1999) did not examine
psychological symptoms, so no other direct comparisons across studies can be made.
However, the many studies demonstrating significant decreases in psychological
symptoms in those participating in a mindfulness-based intervention or meditation retreat
that are not found in control participants, with many demonstrating that participants end
the treatment in the “minimal” range for depression scores (i.e., Baer, 2003; Carmody &
Baer, 2008; Chambers et al., 2008; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992; Kenny & Williams, 2007;
Ramel et al., 2004; Tang et al., 2007), also shed light on the current findings. If
meditation practice improves functioning primarily through reduction of psychological
symptoms and associated cognitive deficits (Chambers et al., 2008; Linehan, 1993a), then
a comparison of nonmeditating controls with meditators who appear to have not obtained
this emotional benefit from their practice would be unlikely to show group differences in
the emotional or cognitive domain. Mindfulness-based intervention studies, which
typically use clinical or at least distressed samples, may show strong effects because the
interventions elicit positive and adaptive changes in emotional functioning which then
promote better cognitive and generalized functioning. A study examining emotional,
cognitive, and self-regulatory functioning with behavioral measures both before and after
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a mindfulness-based intervention may show similar statistically and clinically significant
effects. However, the possibility that the meditating sample had failed to receive an
emotional benefit from their practice does not explain why trait mindfulness failed to
correlate with behavioral measures of cognitive or emotional functioning. While the
possibility that the sampling in this particular study has masked real differences bears
further investigation, this explanation fails to account for the full pattern of results.
A final, and related, possibility is that meditation practice and mindfulness are
more strongly related to self-regulation and less directly related to cognitive and
emotional functioning. Masicampo & Baumeister (2007) have suggested that meditation
practice may lead to beneficial changes due to its inherent extended practice in selfregulation. In other words, they propose that, because meditation practice involves
altering and controlling responses in some way or continuously regulating attention in a
particular manner (i.e., nonjudgementally and repeatedly redirecting one’s attention to a
particular stimulus), the primary mechanism by which meditation practice operates is
through enhanced abilities in self-control, which in turn may cause increases in
mindfulness. Results from the current study may be interpreted as generally supportive of
this notion, given the very large differences in self-regulatory strength (hand-grip task)
and the essential lack of differences in cognitive and emotional functioning found
between the meditating and nonmeditating control groups.
Interestingly, no evidence of ego depletion (change in handgrip performance from
pre- to post-evaluation) was found in either group in the current study, despite the
evidence of differences in self-regulatory strength (handgrip performance at pre- and
post-evaluation). Thus, the current findings are different than those found in previous
research focused on self-control exercise, which has tended to find changes in ego
depletion as opposed to absolute handgrip performance (Gailliot, Plant, Butz, &
Baumeister, 2007; Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999; Oaten & Cheng, 2006a, 2006b).
It is possible that the methods utilized in the current study did not actually elicit ego
depletion. The tasks that were completed by participants between the two handgrip
evaluations were hypothesized to lead to ego depletion because they required regulation
of attention which has been shown to lead to depletion in previous studies (i.e., DeWall,
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Baumesiter, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007). However, a closer look at these studies that elicit
depletion through attention regulation shows some important divergence from the current
study. For example, thought suppression (Wegner, Shortt, Blake, & Page, 1990), actively
ignoring words appearing on a television screen, learning a task and then having to
immediately complete the task with different instructions, and inhibiting the tendency to
read a color word and name the color of ink a word appears in (DeWall et al., 2007) are
examples of the type of research showing that regulation of attention leads to ego
depletion. The tasks in the current research, apart from the Stroop Color-Word Test,
simply required participants to respond as they normally would and not to try to override
their natural tendencies during the task or responses to the task. While regulation of
attention was required, self-regulatory strength may not have been required to any
significant degree, as self-regulation is primarily required for responses for which there is
such a strong motivation to do the opposite (such as refraining from eating something
tempting or enduring physical discomfort) that the exertion of strong self-control is
required to override this tendency (Muraven et al., 1998).
Thus, while questions remain, the practice of meditation may directly build selfregulatory strength, which is known to be related to many aspects of adaptive
functioning, including aspects of the emotional domain (Tangney et al., 2004), though the
current study failed to demonstrate emotional effects. Additionally, the practice of
meditation or skill in mindfulness may allow one to take mental breaks (rest) and/or
engage in hypo-egoic self-regulation, in which deliberate, conscious control over one’s
behavior is relinquished and behavior is enacted more naturally, spontaneously, or
automatically (Leary et al., 2006), which should allow for restoration from or
minimization of ego depletion, respectively. In the total sample, initial handgrip
performance was correlated with psychological well-being, r = .23, p < .05, and with
reflection, r = .27, p < .01, though it was not significantly correlated with psychological
symptoms or rumination, which is partially supportive of the notion that self-regulatory
strength is associated with adaptive psychological functioning. However, no relationship
was found between self-reported trait mindfulness and the hand-grip measures, which
runs counter to the notion that self-regulatory strength actually causes dispositional
mindfulness (Masicampo & Baumeister, 2007). Thus, while the current study suggests
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that more work is needed exploring the relationships between meditation, mindfulness,
and self-regulation and potentially supports the notion that self-regulation is the primary
mechanism by which mindfulness exerts beneficial effects, the current work cannot stand
alone in discounting previous work suggesting primary roles for the enhancement of
cognitive and emotional skills.
Unfortunately, the current research poses more questions than it answers. As the
current research failed to replicate previous research using both self-report and behavioral
measures, it is certainly possible that the prevailing conceptualization of mindfulness
requires moderate to significant revision. However, it is also possible that some aspect of
the current experimental design or sample may be responsible for the contradictory
findings. One limitation of the current study is the fact that it utilized a known-groups,
between-subjects design. While a known-groups design offers many advantages and
group differences were anticipated, sampling issues can be a concern. A replication of
this study with a different sample of meditators may go far in ruling out or supporting the
potential explanations proposed for the current results. It may be important to recruit
participants who are involved with some sort of meditation center to try to minimize
variability in aspects of meditation practice. Additionally, the field would certainly
benefit from future research that utilizes similar behavioral measures to determine
whether they change over the course of a mindfulness-based intervention. Another aspect
of the study that could be improved upon is refinement of some of the utilized
instruments. While care was taken to choose well-designed and validated behavioral
measures, some of the measures may require some minor improvements. For example, it
is possible that “distressed” and “neutral” words may have been more effective than
pictures in measuring avoidance of distressing emotions, as the pictures are of other
people while the construct intended to be measured is personal emotional approach
versus avoidance.
Taken as a whole, however, results suggest that the primary direction for future
research should be the investigation of the relationships between meditation, mindfulness,
and self-regulation. Additional paradigms exist for measuring self-regulatory strength and
ego depletion (i.e., unsolvable anagrams, aggressiveness). Additional studies that utilize
these paradigms and investigate how meditators or those high in trait mindfulness may
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respond differently than controls or those lower in trait mindfulness will likely be
important. In addition, a self-report measure of self-control is available (Tangney et al.,
2004). No research thus far has examined how meditators or those high in trait
mindfulness report on their self-control abilities. Even a self-report study in which these
groups report on mindfulness, self-control, other theorized mechanisms (emotional and
cognitive), and typically recognized endpoints (psychological distress and well-being)
would begin to answer many remaining questions, as these data could be used to
determine whether mindfulness and its related concepts add any incremental validity to
self-control, and vice versa, in predicting outcomes. An investigation into the role of
values and goals in line with Self-Determination Theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 2000) may
also offer interesting insights into why meditation practice or self-regulation abilities are
related to improved outcomes, as these may likely influence goal preference or pursuit,
which have been demonstrated to relate to well-being (Kasser & Ryan, 1996).
Although the current study provided little support for expected effects of
meditation experience and self-reported mindfulness skills, this research points to many
potentially fruitful directions for future research. The current study can serve as a
building block that can ultimately contribute to a better understanding of what
mindfulness is and is not and what effects meditation practice tends to elicit.

Copyright © Emily Lauren Brown Lykins 2009

44

References
Anderson, J. R. (1983). Retrieval of information from long-term memory. Science, 220,
25-30.
Anderson, J. R. (2004). Cognitive psychology and its implications. New York: Worth.
Arch, J. J., & Craske, M. G. (2006). Mechanisms of mindfulness: Emotion regulation
following a focused breathing induction. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44,
1849-1858.
Baer, R. A. (2003). Mindfulness training as a clinical intervention: A conceptual and
empirical review. Clinical Psychology: Science & Practice, 10, 125-143.
Baer, R. A., Smith, G., Lykins, E. L. B., Button, D., Krietemeyer, J., Sauer, S., Walsh, E.,
Duggan, D., & Williams, J. M. G. (2007). Mindfulness and psychological wellbeing in experienced meditators. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Baer, R. A., Smith, G. T., Hopkins, J., Krietemeyer, J., & Toney, L. T. (2006). Using
self-report assessment methods to explore facets of mindfulness. Assessment, 13,
27-45.
Baumeister, R. F. (2002). Ego depletion and self-control failure: An energy model of the
self’s executive function. Self and Identity, 1, 129-136.
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: Is
the active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
74, 1252-1265.
Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice, D. M. (1994). Losing Control: How and
Why People Fail at Self-Regulation. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Baumeister, R. F., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (2000). Ego depletion: A resource model
of volition, self-regulation, and controlled processing. Social Cognition, 18, 130150.
Bishop, S. R., Lau, M., Shapiro, S., Carlson, L., Anderson, N. D., Carmody, J., et al.
(2004). Mindfulness: A proposed operational definition. Clinical Psychology:
Science and Practice, 11, 230-241.
Bogels, S. M., Sijbers, G. F., & Voncken, M. (2006). Mindfulness and task concentration
training for social phobia: A pilot study. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 20,
33-44.
Brown, K. W., & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its
role in psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
84, 822-848.
Brown, K. W., Ryan, R. M., & Creswell, J. D. (2007). Mindfulness: Theoretical
foundations and evidence for its salutary effects. Psychological Inquiry, 18, 211237.
Campbell-Sills, L., Barlow, D. H., Brown, T. A., & Hofmann, S. G. (2006). Acceptability
and suppression of negative emotion in anxiety and mood disorders. Emotion, 6,
587-595.
Carmody, J. & Baer, R. A. (2008). Relationships between mindfulness practice and levels
of mindfulness, medical and psychological symptoms, and well-being in a
mindfulness-based stress reduction program. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 31,
23-33.

45

Chambers, R., Lo, B. C. Y., & Allen, N. B. (2008). The impact of intensive mindfulness
training on attentional control, cognitive style, and affect. Cognitive Therapy and
Research, 32, 303-322.
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.).
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates.
Cowan, N. (1997). Attention and memory: An integrated framework. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of
mental storage capacity. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 24, 87-185.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The what" and why" of goal pursuits: Human needs
and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227-268.
De Houwer, J., & De Bruycker, E. (2007). The implicit association test outperforms the
extrinsic affective Simon task as an implicit measure of inter-individual
differences in attitudes. British Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 401-421.
D'Elia, L. F., Satz, P., Uchiyama, C. L., & White, T. (1994). Color Trails Test:
Professional manual. Psychological Assessment Resources.
Delis, D. C., Kramer, J. H., Kaplan, E., & Ober, B. A. (1987). California Verbal Learning
Test: Adult version manual. San Antonio, TX: The Psychological Corporation.
DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., Stillman, T. F., & Gailliot, M. T. (2007). Violence
restrained: Effects of self-regulation and its depletion on aggression. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 62.76.
Eifert, G.H., & Heffner, M. (2003). The effects of acceptance versus control contexts on
avoidance of panic-related symptoms. Journal of Behavior Therapy and
Experimental Psychiatry, 34, 293-312.
Engle, R. W., Kane, M. J., & Tuholski, S. W. (1999). Individual differences in working
memory capacity and what they tell us about controlled attention, general fluid
intelligence, and functions of the prefrontal cortex. In P. Shah & A. Miyake
(Eds.), Models of working memory: Mechanisms of active maintenance and
executive control (pp. 102-134). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. T., & Tesch-Romer, C. (1993). The role of deliberate
practice in the acquisition of expert performance. Psychological Review, 100,
363-406.
Fitts, P. M., & Posner, M. I. (1967). Human performance. Oxford: Brooks/Cole.
Fletcher, L., & Hayes, S. C. (2005). Relational Frame Theory, Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy, and a functional analytic definition of mindfulness.
Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 23, 315-336.
Gailliot, M., Plant, E. A., Butz, D. A., & Baumeister, R. F. (2007). Increasing selfregulatory strength via exercise can reduce the depleting effect of suppressing
stereotypes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 1-16.
Gemar, M. C., Segal, Z. V., Sagrati, S., & Kennedy, S. J. (2001). Mood-induced changes
on the Implicit Association Test in recovered depressed patients. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 110, 282-289.
Goldstein, J. (2002). One Dharma: The emerging Western Buddhism. San Francisco:
Harper Collins.
Gordon, M. (1986). How is a computerised attention test used in the diagnosis of
attention

46

deficit disorder? Journal of Child Contemporary Sociology, 19, 53–64.
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual
differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480.
Grossman, P., Niemann, L., Schmidt, S., & Walach, H. (2004). Mindfulness-based stress
reduction and health benefits: A meta-analysis. Journal of Psychosomatic
Research, 57, 35-43.
Grumm, M., & von Collani, G. (2007). Measuring Big-Five personality dimension with
the implicit association test – Implicit personality traits or self-esteem?
Personality and Individual Differneces, 43, 2205-2217.
Harvey, A. G., Watkins, E., Mansell, W., & Shafran, R. (2004). Cognitive behavioural
processes across psychological disorders: A transdiagnostic approach to
research and treatment. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K., & Wilson, K. (1999). Acceptance and commitment therapy:
An experiential approach to behavior change. New York: Guilford Press.
Heppner, W. L., & Kernis, M. H. (2007). "Quiet ego" functioning: The complementary
roles of mindfulness, authenticity, and secure high self-esteem. Psychological
Inquiry, 18, 248-251.
Jha, A. P., Krompinger, J., & Baime, M. J. (2007). Mindfulness training modifies
subsystems of attention. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 109119.
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1982). An outpatient program in behavioral medicine for chronic pain
patients based on the practice of mindfulness meditation: Theoretical
considerations and preliminary results. General Hospital Psychiatry, 4, 33-47.
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1990). Full catastrophe living: Using the wisdom of your mind and body
to face stress, pain, and illness. New York: Delacorte.
Kabat-Zinn, J. (2000). Indra’s net at work: The mainstreaming of Dharma practice in
society. In G. Watson & S. Batchelor (Eds.), The psychology of awakening:
Buddhism, science, and our day-to-day lives (pp. 225-249). North Beach, ME:
Weiser.
Kabat-Zinn, J., Massion, M. D., Kristeller, J., Peterson, L. G., Fletcher, K. E., Pbert, L., et
al. (1992). Effectiveness of a meditation-based stress reduction program in the
treatment of anxiety disorders. American Journal of Psychiatry, 149, 936-943.
Kasser, T., & Ryan, R. M. (1996). Further examining the American Dream: Differential
correlates of intrinsic and extrinsic goals. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 2, 280-287.
Kenny, M. A., & Williams, J. M. G. (2007). Treatment-resistant depressed patients show
a good response to Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy. Behaviour Therapy
and Research, 45, 617-625.
Kutz, I., Leserman, J., Dorrington, C., Morrison, C., Borysenko, J., & Benson, H. (1985).
Meditation as an adjunct to psychotherapy: An outcome study. Psychotherapy
and Psychosomatics, 43, 209-218.
Lawrence, C. A., Barry, R. J., Clarke, A. R., Johnstone, S. J., McCarthy, R., Selikowitz,
M., et al. (2005), Methylphenidate effects in attention deficit/hyperactivity
disorder: electrodermal and ERP measures during a continuous performance task.
Psychopharmacology, 183, 81-91.

47

Leary, M. R., Adams, C. E., Tate, E. B. (2006). Hypo-egoic self-regulation: Exercising
self-control by diminishing the influence of the self. Journal of Personality, 74,
1803-1831.
Linehan, M. M. (1993a). Cognitive-behavioral treatment of borderline personality
disorder. New York: Guilford.
Linehan, M. M. (1993b). Skills training manual for treating borderline personality
disorder. New York: Guilford.
Lykins, E. L. B., & Baer, R. A. (in press). Psychological functioning in a sample of
individuals with long-term meditation experience. Journal of Cognitive
Psychotherapy.
Marlatt, G. A., & Gordon, J. R. (1985). Relapse prevention: Maintenance strategies in
the treatment of addictive behaviors. New York: Guilford.
Marlatt, G. A., & Kristeller, J. L. (1999). Mindfulness and meditation. In R. W. Miller
(Ed.), Integrating spirituality into treatment (pp. 67-84). Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.
Martijn, C., Alberts, H. J. E. M., Merckelbach, H., Havermans, R., Huijts, A., & De
Vries, N. K. (2007). Overcoming ego-depletion: The influence of exemplar
priming on self-control performance. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37,
231-238.
Masicampo, E. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2007). Relating mindfulness and self-regulatory
processes. Psychological Inquiry, 18, 255-258.
Massion, A. O., Teas, J., Hebert, J. R., Wertheimer, M. D., & Kabat-Zinn, J. (1995).
Meditation, melatonin, and breast/prostate cancer: Hypothesis and preliminary
data. Medical Hypotheses, 44, 39-46.
Miller, J. J., Fletcher, K., & Kabat-Zinn, J. (1995). Three-year follow-up and clinical
implications of a mindfulness meditation-based stress reduction intervention in
the treatment of anxiety disorders. General Hospital Psychiatry, 17, 192-200.
Mirsky, A. F., Anthony, B. J., Duncan, C. C., Ahearn, M. B., & Kellam, S. G. (1991).
Analysis of the elements of attention: A neuropsychological approach.
Neuropsychology Review, 2, 109-145.
Muraven, M. R., Baumeister, R. F., & Tice, D. M. (1999). Longitudinal improvement in
self-regulation through practice: Building self-control through repeated exercise.
Journal of Social Psychology, 139, 446-457.
Muraven, M., Tice, D. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Self-control as limited resource:
Regulatory depletion patterns. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74,
774-789.
Oaten, M., & Cheng, K. (2006a). Improved self-control: The benefits of a regular
program of academic study. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 28, 1-16.
Oaten, M., & Cheng, K. (2006b). Longitudinal gains in self-control from regular physical
exercise. British Journal of Health Psychology, 11, 717-733.
Parasuraman, R., & Davies, R. D. (1976). Decision theory analysis of response latencies
in vigilance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 2, 578-590.
Parks, G. A., Anderson, B. K., & Marlatt, G. A. (2001). Relapse prevention therapy. In
N. Heather, T. J. Peters, & T. Stockwell (Eds.), International handbook of alcohol
dependence and problems (pp. 575-592). New York: John Wiley.

48

Posner, M. I. (1980). Orienting of attention. Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 32, 3-25.
Posner, M. I., & Rothbart, M. K. (1992). Attentional mechanisms and conscious
experience. In A. D. Milner & M. D. Rugg (Eds.), The neuropsychology of
consciousness (pp. 91-111). Toronto: Academic Press.
Ramel, W., Goldin, P. R., Carmona, P. E., & McQuaid, J. R. (2004). The effects of
mindfulness meditation on cognitive processes and affect in patients with past
depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 28, 433-455.
Ruff, R. M., & Allen, C. C. (1996). Ruff 2 and 7 Selective Attention Test professional
manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources, Inc.
Ruff, R. M., Niemann, H., Allen, C. C., Farrow, C. E., & Wylie, T. (1992). The Ruff 2
and 7 Selective Attention Test: A neuropsychological application. Perceptual and
Motor Skills, 75, 1311-1319.
Segal, Z. V., Williams, J. M. G., & Teasdale, J. D. (2002). Mindfulness-based cognitive
therapy for depression: A new approach to preventing relapse. New York:
Guilford.
Semple, R. J., Reid, E. F. G., & Miller, L. (2005). Treating anxiety with mindfulness: An
open trial of mindfulness training for anxious children. Journal of Cognitive
Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 19, 379-392.
Shapiro, S. L., & Schwartz, G. E. (2000). Intentional systemic mindfulness: An
integrative model for self-regulation and health. Advances in Mind-Body
Medicine, 16, 128-134.
Slagter, H. A., Lutz, A., Greishar, L. L., Francis, A. D., Nieuwenhuis, S., Davis, J. M., &
Davidson, R. J. (2007). Mental training affects distribution of limited brain
resources. PLoS Biology, 5, e138.
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 18, 643-662.
Tang, Y.-Y., Ma, Y., Wang, J., Fan, Y., Feng, S., Lu, Q., et al. (2007). Short-term
meditation training improves attention and self-regulation. PNAS, 104, 1715217156.
Tangney, J. P., Baumeister, R. F., & Boone, A. L. (2004). High self-control predicts good
adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success. Journal of
Personality, 72, 271-322.
Tice, D. M., Baumeister, R. F., Shmueli, D., & Muraven, M. (2007). Restoring the self:
Positive affect helps improve self-regulation following ego depletion. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 379-384.
Trick, L. M., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1994). Why are small and large numbers enumerated
differently? A limited-capacity preattentive stage in vision. Psychological Review,
101, 80-102.
Valentine, E. R., & Sweet, P. L. G. (1999). Meditation and attention: a comparison of the
effects of concentrative and mindfulness meditation on sustained attention.
Mental Health, Religion, & Culture, 2, 59-70.
Wechsler, D. (1997). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. 3rd ed, Administration and
Scoring Manual TPC. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wegner, D. M., Shortt, J. W., Blake, A. W., & Page, M. S. (1990). The suppression of
exciting thoughts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 409–418.

49

Wenk-Sormaz, H. (2005). Meditation can reduce habitual responding. Alternative
Therapies in Health & Medicine, 11, 42-58.

50

Vita
Emily Lauren Brown Lykins
Date of Birth: November 7, 1981
Place of Birth: Richmond, Indiana
Education:
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
BA in Psychology, 2004
University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky
MS in Clinical Psychology, 2006
Honors:
Research Challenge Trust Fund Fellowship, 2008-2009
Award for Outstanding Clinical Performance, 2008
Graduate Research Incentive Program Enhancement Award, 2007
Research Challenge Trust Fund Research Support Award, 2007
Commonwealth Research Award recipient, 2005
Graduation (BA) with Highest Honors, 2004
Graduation (BA) with Honors in Psychology, 2004
Honors College Thesis Award recipient, 2004
Cheryl Burnham Buhler Award for Outstanding Psychology Student, 2004
Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society, inductee, 2004
Sigma Xi Undergraduate Research Award, 2004
Herman B. Wells Scholarship recipient, 2000-2004
Phi Beta Kappa inductee, 2003
Honors College Research Grant recipient, 2003
Professional Positions:
University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY
Research assistant, September 2004 – present.
University of Kentucky, Jesse G. Harris Psychological Services Center
Graduate student clinician, August 2005 – present.
University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY
Instructor, Summer 2007, Summer 2008.
University of Kentucky, Family and Community Medicine, Lexington, KY
Psychology resident, July 2006 – June 2007.
University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY
Teaching assistant, September 2004 – May 2005, Summer 2006.
University of Kentucky, Testing and Counseling Center, Lexington, KY
Therapist, August 2005 – May 2006;
Process observer, Summer 2005.
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN
Undergraduate teaching assistant, January 2003 – May 2003.

51

The Rise! Transitional Housing Facility, Bloomington, IN
Undergraduate intern, Summer 2003.
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN
Undergraduate research assistant, August 2001 – May 2002.
Creative Counseling Services, Connersville, IN
Intern, August 1999 – June 2000.
Professional Publications:
Lykins, E. L. B., & Baer, R. A. (in press). Psychological functioning in a sample of
individuals with long-term meditation experience. Journal of Cognitive
Psychotherapy.
Baer, R. A., & Lykins, E. L. B. (in press). Mindfulness and positive psychology: Parallels
and paradox. In K. Sheldon, T. Kashdan, & M. Steger (Eds.), Designing the
Future of Positive Psychology: Taking Stock and Moving Forward. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Carmody, J., Baer, R. A., Lykins, E. L. B., & Olendzki, N. (in press). An empirical study
of the mechanisms of mindfulness in a mindfulness-based stress reduction
program. Journal of Clinical Psychology.
Baer, R. A., Walsh, E., & Lykins, E. L. B. (in press). Assessment of mindfulness. In. F.
Didonna (Ed.), Clinical Handbook of Mindfulness. New York: Springer.
Lykins, E. L. B., Graue, L., Brechting, E. H., Roach, A., Gochette, C., & Andrykowski,
M. (in press). Beliefs about cancer causation and prevention as a function of
personal and family history of cancer: A national, population-based study.
Psycho-Oncology.
Roach, A., Lykins, E. L. B., Gochette, C., Brechting, E. H., Graue, L., & Andrykowski,
M. A. (in press). Differences in cancer information seeking, preferences, and
awareness between cancer survivors and healthy controls: A national, populationbased survey. Journal of Cancer Education.
Baer, R. A., Smith, G. T., Lykins, E. L. B., Button, D., Krietemeyer, J., Sauer, S., Walsh,
E., Duggan, D., & Williams, J. M. G. (2008). Construct validity of the Five Facet
Mindfulness Questionnaire in meditating and nonmeditating samples. Assessment,
15, 329-342.
Andrykowski, M. A., Lykins, E. L. B., & Floyd, A. (2008). Psychological health in
cancer survivors. Seminars in Oncology Nursing, 24, 193-201.
Lykins, E. L. B., Segerstrom, S. C., Averill, A. J., Evans, D. R., & Kemeny, M. E.
(2007). Goal shifts following reminders of mortality: Reconciling posttraumatic
growth and terror management theory. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 33, 1088-1099.
Lykins, E. L. B., Pavlik, E. L., & Andrykowski, M. A. (2007). Validity of self-reports of
return for routine repeat screening in an ovarian cancer screening program.
Cancer Epidemiology Biomarkers & Prevention, 16, 490-493.
Baer, R. A., & Lykins, E. L. B. (2007). Mindfulness in individual psychotherapy.
[Review of the DVD Mindful Therapy.] PsycCRITIQUES, 52 (36).

52

